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1Socialism without liberation
Land Reclamation Projects in Guinea-Bissau
Dirk Kohnert1
National liberation, the struggle against colonialism ... will be empty words without 
significance for the people, unless they are translated into real improvement of the 
conditions of life. (Amilcar Cabral 1956)
Abstract: One of the outstanding aims of most liberation movements has been to increase 
the economic well-being of their people, Guinea-Bissau being no exception in this respect. 
How far has the new Nation State succeeded in fulfilling this aim? A comparative analysis 
of the implementation of land reclamation projects during colonial and post-colonial times 
reveals astonishing similarities: especially the centralization of development efforts in the 
hands of administrators disconnected from the grassroots, lack of target group analysis and 
misconceptions about the aims and needs, as well as the resources, of the population 
involved in the development efforts, on the part of the administration. The effects of this
negative conditioning process of 'development' over many years on the chances of 
cooperation between peasants and the administration are still largely unknown. Any 
development planner who wants to encourage the local population to take their future into 
their own hands, would have to take account of this negative conditioning process. 
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2One of the outstanding aims of most liberation movements has been to increase the 
economic well-being of their people, Guinea-Bissau being no exception in this respect. 
How far has the new Nation State succeeded in fulfilling this aim? In this regard Guinea-
Bissau provides the unique opportunity to answer the question by means of a comparative 
analysis of one and the same type of development projects, its execution and success, 
during colonial and post-colonial times.
Among the economic aims of the new Guinea State self-sufficiency in staple food 
production was given priority, in order to reduce dependency on food imports, improve the 
food supply of the urban population and conditions of life in general. Under the special 
ecological, socio-economic and cultural conditions of the country the growth of rice 
production has been considered to be the most promising way out of the perpetual food 
crisis, like in colonial times. The agricultural census of 1953 stated for example that wet 
rice was the most lucrative of all staple foods for the indigenous producer, because the 
yield per hectare in the rice polders was estimated to be about three times as high as in the 
dry upland rice fields (Mota 1954, 2:151), and because only 45% of the economically 
cultivable area had been used in 1953 (Cabral 1956:37, 41).
Therefore, it is not surprising that the rehabilitation of rice polders (bolanhas salgadas), 
abandoned since the establishment of Colonial Rule for a variety of socio-economic 
reasons, counted among the most important agricultural development projects under the 
Portuguese as well as under the post-independence government. However, a preliminary 
evaluation of these projects which is still under way, revealed serious problems concerning 
economic viability for the peasants as well as 'cultural barriers' to acceptance of the newly 
gained bolanhas. This was by no means a new insight. Already in the 1950s the 
Portuguese Colonial [161] Administration was stressing the importance of ecological 
investigation to overcome difficulties in the execution of similar projects (Mota 
1951:672/73). The present contribution is meant to highlight the socio-economic 
problems caused by the articulation of different modes of production within the sphere of 
land reclamation projects in Guinea-Bissau, as well as reasons for the incapacity of the 
development administration, before and after independence, to cope with these 
problems.
The communal mode of production in the bolonhas
During the past four or five centuries the Papels, Manjacos, and Balanta in the littoral 
regions of Guinea-Bissau developed a highly sophisticated system of drainage and 
irrigation of their riverside marshland (bolanhas) which seems to be unique in West 
Africa. First references to the existence of bolanhas in the region of Cacheu were included 
in the accounts of the early Portuguese commanders of the 1 7th century1 . Captain Martins, 
who visited the country in 1831 in search of profitable investments for the Portuguese, 
was surprised by the rich potential of swamp rice cultivation in the Biombo region, where 
the local kings and rich landlords lived by 'heavy  taxation   of  their  poor  labourers   
and  frequent  wars'   (Faro 1958:207). Whereas the technical aspects of this production 
system have been described already in detail, the social organization has been little 
known up to now. The communal organization of the principal activities on these rice 
3polders, that is construction of dikes, irrigation canals and gates, maintenance and so 
on, by village elders and age groups, the interrelationship between participation in these 
activities and the distribution of land and production, and the (extended) family 
cultivation of different parcels of the polder seem to be the main characteristics of 
production in the bolanhas (Hochet 1979a: 26-38; 1979b: 10-16, 28/29; Handem 1986), 
predominantly of the Balanta in the south. This production system has been undermined 
seriously, however, by the effects of the Liberation War as will be seen.
Among the Papels and Manjacos of the north the communal mode of production in the 
bolanhas has been closely interwoven with a 'semi-feudal' superstructure. Local kings 
(regulos) and religious heads (jamba-cosses) dominated the social organization of the 
works, and appropriated vast stretches of fertile marshland as royal land (bens de reinança). 
In the local kingdom of the Costa de Baixo for example, in 1945 still existed 132 bolanhas 
which were exploited as bens de reinança - 77 directly by the family of the local ruler, and 
55 rented out to others. These traditional estates and their usufruct were one of the main 
reasons for disputes between different royal families over the chieftainship (Carreira 
1951:44). [162] 
The local rulers, often connected with secret societies hostile to the colonial 
administration, demanded tribute in kind and in labour for their services as mediators 
between the supernatural world and the population to protect the bolanhas, for example 
by religious-magic ceremonies before planting and harvesting. According to Mota (1951) 
the principles of social organization of the Papels and Manjacos are probably related to the 
organization of secret societies.
The colonial administrators tried to put an end to these feudal reminiscences, but in vain 
(Carreira 1951:53/54). Bens de reinança existed up to independence, even if to a lesser 
extent, in the Biombo and Cacheu regions. However, the traditional social structure was 
at least partially destroyed by the colonial mode of production, notably by the deposing of 
many ancient rulers, with the consequent lack of religious-magic protection for the dikes 
and irrigation systems. Carreira (1946, 1951) holds that each vacant post of local ruler at 
that time accounted for dozens of abandoned bolanhas. Without such protection2, many 
Manjacos or Papels do not dare to work on the bolanhas even today. In the region of 
Cacheu the widely-known myth on the bolanha of Qui (included in Hochet 1980b:45) 
explains why, even today, few peasants dare to cultivate the 'royal' bolanhas without 
permission from the regulo. On the other hand some local kings and elders managed at the 
same time to secure private title to vast stretches of land, either belonging to their former 
'royal land’ or the newly reclaimed bolanhas. Thus for example the regulo of Biombo, 
who owned no land in the Ondame region, gained the greatest part of the bolanha of 
Picle, the reclamation of which he supervised in the 1950s.
Reclamation of bolanhas in colonial times
Since the beginning of World War II we can observe a more or less steady decline of 
commercialized rice production in Guinea-Bissau. Whereas the country exported rice in 
considerable quantities before and during the war, especially to Portugal and to the Cap 
Verdes, these exports diminished gradually in the 1950s and came completely to a halt 
in 1960s. Whether this indicates decreasing rice production overall or substitution of 
official export production by production for the local smuggling, barter trade with 
4neighboring countries or subsistence is not known. But we may safely conclude that up to 
1960 the country was more or less self-sufficient in rice production. Since the early 1960s, 
when for the first time rice had to be imported in appreciable quantities, an ever 
increasing import trend became apparent.
These macro-economic trends are reflected in the micro-economic sphere as well. 
The peasants of Ondame, a traditional Papel rice growing village in Biombo region, relate 
for example that before 1948 they sold about 60 tons of rice annually to the three retailers 
in their village and used [163] to barter rice for cattle in the neighbouring isle of Pecixe as 
well. Since 1948 they stopped these sales, and from 1956 on an inverse movement was 
observed, each merchant of Ondame buying 5 tons of imported rice weekly in Bissau, 
which he resold in the village. Between 1970 and 1973 one of them could even sell 5 tons 
of rice from Bissau twice a week in Ondame (Hochet 1980:6/7). Not every stratum within 
the village was equally affected, however. Contrary to widespread assumption, village 
society even in the relatively egalitarian Guinea-Bissau is not a homogeneous socio-
economic entity. Rich peasants were self-sufficient even in bad years, and could barter 
their surplus for basic consumer goods which were much in demand. Poor peasants on the 
other hand often could not even save seed for the next season (ibid: 7/8). According to 
own inquiries in March 1986 the range of rice production per family in the great bolanha 
of Picle, bordering Ondame to the south and west, varied between 20 and 300 bushels. 
The two large fields of the local king of this region in Picle provided him with an income 
of 1.000 bushels in 1985, according to his own estimates. It appears that up to the end of 
colorn'al rule (1971-73), when the same regulo, as he said, owned two huge gra'naries 
filled to the j roof with rice, the socio-economic differences were at least equally 
pronounced.
This picture of decreasing food production since the end of colonial rule is quite familiar 
to the observer of other African countries. What do we know about its determinants, apart 
from the different resource position of the peasants mentioned above? We may distinguish 
with respect to Guinea-Bissau between two principal phases of development: the first 
relates to the wave of abandoned bolanhas in early colonial times, the second to the effects 
of the war of liberation, to ecological changes in the 1960s and 1970s, and to the new
economic policy which will be analysed below.
In the aftermath of the 'pacification' of their colony (since about 1915) the Portuguese 
observed a 'miraculous' decline of swamp rice production. Their analyses revealed two 
principal causes for abandoning the ancient bolanhas. First, the spread of groundnut 
production, which in many parts of the colony had been replacing rice cultivation 
gradually since the middle of the 19th century, accelerated between 1915 and 1935. It had 
devastating ecological side effects, which was one reason for the massive wave of Balanta 
emigrants from the north to the south of the country, and the consequent lack of manpower 
to maintain the infrastructure of the rice polders of Cacheu, Oio, and Biombo region (Mota 
1950:164/65; Ribeiro 1985). Certainly there were other no less convincing reasons for the 
migration, such as the especially heavy taxation and recruitment of forced labour in the 
northern districts (Carreira 1951:262), the attraction of the nearby capital and the 
insecurity of land tenure under the existing 'semi-feudal' production systems of the 
Papels and Manjacos. The second determinant was the partial destruction of the traditional 
social system by the Portuguese described above. 
In the paternalistic view of the colonialists, it was only natural that the colonial 
administration, or one of its local representatives, had to take the place of the deposed 
5traditional rulers in organizing the maintenance and rehabilitation of the abandoned bolanhas. 
For, it was said, the organization requires 'authority, discipline, and resources... it is 
therefore, necessary that the administrative authorities have to intervene increasingly in the 
economic life of the native tribes... the tribal organization is vanishing, yielding in view of the 
provincial administration' (Santareno 1957:367/68). Apparently the time of self-help and local 
participation slogans was still to come. Thus, this period may be considered as the beginning 
of the ever-increasing involvement of the state in the rural development process in Guinea-
Bissau, implying the substitution of self-initiative and local planning capacity by a centralized 
apparatus, adminis-tered by the 'state class', disconnected from basic local aims, needs and 
resources.
The objective of the land reclamation projects was not just to increase production and export 
of rice, but also to augment the purchasing power of the peasantry and thus their ability to 
pay taxes into the coffers of the Portuguese, and last not least to 'educate' the 'uncivilized' 
natives. The latter was apparently considered to be especially important for the rebellious 
Papels of Biombo, said to be 'disrespectful and indolent'. They had, therefore, to become 
accustomed to the virtues of civilization, especially discipline and rigid rules, as an 
anonymous Portuguese administrator stated. 
The increasing incidence of abandoned bolanhas made it imperative for the colonialists to 
intervene immediately. In 1946, the first year of the campaign, a total of 7000 ha of land had 
been reclaimed, which was said to represent an increase in rice production of about 6000 tons. 
There were more than 60 projects of this kind with about 10,000 ha and a total of 90 km of 
dikes recorded one year later. But the actual number of project' "as probably higher because 
many of them, especially in the Catio region had not been recorded officially (Mota 
1948:121). The works were conducted with great élan on the part of administrators and 
local rulers. The latter expressed their satisfaction with the progress of the projects which, 
they said, were the most important ones since the time of Teixeira Pinto (the wars of colonial 
conquest in Biombo), as stated proudly in the Colonial Reports. Their subjects apparently 
were not quite so pleased. The same reports deplored certain 'social difficulties' in the 
execution of the projects, because of the lack of interest on the part of the natives, who had 
'yet to get accustomed to work', although the projects were meant to serve their proper 
interest. In big projects like the reclamation of the bolanha of Picle (1500 ha), where 14 
km of dikes had to be reconstructed [165] in 45 days, thousands of peasants had to 
participate. In other medium sized bolanhas, like Ponta Vincente de Mata, 4000 man-
days were required to reconstruct 80 ha of rice polders. But labour inputs oscillated 
considerably between 1.3 and 50 man-days per ha, corresponding to the different kinds 
of work executed.
Fortunately a detailed account of the implementation of one of these land reclamation 
projects exists, which makes possible a comparison with the execution of similar projects 
after independence. The bolanha of Bedeme on the isle of Pecixe, Cacheu Division, was 
one of the largest land reclamation projects at that time. The District officer, A.M. de 
Meireles, who supervised the work, made a detailed report on the execution of the project 
to Divisional Headquarters which was published as an example in the annex of the 
Boletim Cultural de Guine Portuguesa of 1946. Apart from the general aims mentioned 
above, this bolanha was apparently selected because of the assumed spread effects. 
Bedeme was the largest bolanha on that island. It had been intended to divide the land in 
small parcels for a hundred family farms. These were supposed to be able to increase 
production rapidly, within only six months, providing a surplus for sale above 
subsistence needs, thus giving an incentive for others to follow.
6The preparatory work, that is preparation of a work schedule, land survey and 
contacts with the population, to meet the demands of the administration for the 
collaboration, took only eight days. On 14 April 1946 the work started and it was 
finished on 12 May of the same year. On average 300 peasants (about one third of the 
working population) had to work daily on the project, reconstructing dikes, closing the 
river arms or breaches in the old dike and so on. In the end a total of 3200 ha of rice 
swamps, unused for the previous six years, had been reclaimed. This equaled production of 
1370 tons of rice per growing season, whereas in previous years 300 tons of rice had to be 
imported to the island to meet the subsistence needs of the population. On the 'social 
value' of the project Meireles remarked that it would most probably put an end to the 
great incidence of migration from Pecixe and, in general, represented the most effective of 
all methods of technical assistance for the peasantry he could think of:
Their (the natives') confidence in our methods of colonization — which is already considerable —
increased, because they see that the Government not just demands taxes, but helps them out of their 
crisis... the natives' comprehension of our methods of administration means that any order of the 
Authority will be promptly and respectfully followed (B.C. 1946,4:815). [166]
The latter remarks illuminated the way in which the colonialists tried to 'educate' the so 
called 'non-civilized' part of the population. Fortunately, however, this also showed the 
great illusion and overestimation of its own impact, a hypocritical attitude which may be 
typical of the development administration even today, though to a lesser extent.
During the guerilla war against the colonial power, which started a decade later, the 
actions of the persons involved in the very project described above demonstrate rather the 
opposite of peasant confidence. Even at the beginning of the project it became clear that 
many peasants resisted participation. About fifty fled to Bissau to evade conscription into 
the kind of forced labour which the administration had in view for them. Afterwards the 
fugitives returned one after another, by what means of moral persuasion or coercion we 
can only imagine. The present traditional king of Biombo, who participated in supervising 
the neighboring great bolanha of Picle at that time said, that he used to mark which 
peasants did not appear for work more than two days and informed against them to the local 
police. Normally these persons were beaten up and detained over night in prison, to be 
driven to the work site the following day.
Of course the labourers were not paid, but just given food twice a day. Palm wine was 
provided by the local rulers to the two villages which did have to participate in the 
construction works. A part of the labourers had to be recruited from the surrounding 
villages. Each had to delegate-one third of its able-bodied men each week. Each labourer 
had to work three weeks alternating with two weeks rest. In addition 20 women had to 
transport rice and prepare food. Thus there was hardly any time left for other occupations 
during the dry season, which may have been especially hard for the poorer section of the 
population. They could not expect to get sufficient land from the project to cover their needs, 
and so had to rely on secondary income, usually from seasonal migration to the isles of 
Bijagos for palm wine tapping and palm nut collecting or to the Senegal.
Nevertheless this 'food-for-work' programme seems to have worked reasonably under 
the 'close supervision' described above, at least there were no reported desertions. As usual 
all the local rulers participating in the organization, especially in the recruitment of 
labourers, showed great zeal and dedication to the work. No wonder, because as the report 
stated frankly, 'they got doubtless the greatest interest in the services because they 
profited most' (B.C. 1946,4:813).
7Most of the other land reclamation projects in the 1950s and early 1960s described in 
various editions of the Boletim Cultural may have been executed in a similar way. The 
principal characteristic, from a technical point of view, was that the traditional mode of 
construction of the bolanhas was adopted without much alteration: in modern 
terminology 'labour intensive intermediate technology'*[167]. 
The projects certainly seem to have had incisive repercussions on the communal mode of 
production described above, especially on the land tenure system, as the increasing 
numbers of court cases in this area proved. Often the civil colonial administration had to 
intervene because of land disputes between emigrants and new settlers, between different 
ethnic groups in one village or between neighbouring villages, which all had a claim on 
the same parcel of reclaimed land. These disputes apparently could not be resolved by the 
project itself because of insufficient local participation even in the identification stage of 
the project. In 1973/74 the District Authorities of Buba had, for example, to readjust the 
division of the bolanha between Pete and Umbrum because the division brought about 
by the project prejudiced the population of Pete, the field boundaries between the 
Balanta of Umbrum and their landlords had to be changed as well. This question and 
other problems caused by the articulation of the communal and colonial mode of 
production will be analysed at a later stage.
Reclamation of blonahas since independence 
A comparison of the cultivated area in 1953 and 1976 reveals an overall reduction of the 
cultivated swamp rice area in Guinea-Bissau by nearly 18,000 ha or 14% (cf. Table 1). 
This represents an estimated decrease in paddy rice production of about 15% (from 95,265 
tons in 1953 to 76,000 tons in 1976).
Table 1. Evolution of cultivated swamp-rice area, 19)3-1976 (ha) 
Region 1953 1976 difference %
Oio 40.900 26.000 - 14.900 -36,4
Tombali 11.500 21.000 +   9.500 82,6
Cacheu 28.500 18.000 - 10.500 -36,8
Quinara 7.600 15.000 +  7.400 97,4
Bafata 14.500 14.600 +     100 0,7
Biombo 9.000 7.000 -   2.000 -22,2
Gabu 10.100 5.000 -   5.100 -50,5
Bolama 2.600 400 -   2.200 -84,6
Total 124.70
0
107.000 -17.700 -14,2
Source: Schwarz (1982:7)
Each stratum of the village and each region was affected differently however. As Table 1 
shows, a substantial increase of bolanhas is observed in the southern regions of Tombali 
8and Quinara. Here the state-owned Armazéns de Povo and SOCOMIN were buying 
between 1000 and 8700 tons of rice annually from 1975 to 1982, depending on annual 
variations [168] in production. On the other hand the reduction of bolanhas was especially 
felt in the northern provinces of Cacheu, Oio and Biombo, which at least officially did not 
sell any rice after independence, apart from a small amount in Oio. The clandestine 
movements of rice, for example across the border into Senegal, may have been 
considerable, however. But each of these regions received large amounts of imported and 
commercial rice from the international food aid programme (Schwarz 1982:21). 
The reasons given for the decreasing area of cultivated swamp rice  in the north since 1953 
are firstly ecological and climatic, the diminishing rains and the effects of the Sahel 
drought as well as the subsequent salination and acidification of the rice polders. And 
secondly the effects of the luta armada, the 1961-74 war of liberation which provoked 
an increasing migration across the border, to Bissau, or to the south (Schwarz 1982:8). 
The direct effects of the war such as forced emigration of the peasants, bombardment of 
dikes and dams, have probably been overestimated however. They were said to be 
especially severe in the south, but we observed that the greatest reductions were not 
in the south but in the north. Hochet (1980a) states that the destruction of the irrigation 
systems and dikes of Como-Caiar was due not so much to bombardment by the 
colonialists as to the lack of organization of maintenance works on the part of ponteiros, 
the old Portuguese farmers. In addition a survey by the  Ministry of Planning in 1980/81 
revealed that the peasants related the abandoning of their bolanhas overwhelmingly to 
the 'entrance salt water' and lack of rain; the war was hardly ever mentioned as a 
factor. Therefore we hold that ecological and especially negative social and economic 
effects, the lack of incentives for production due to a maladjusted price policy, negative 
inter-sectoral terms of trade, lack of transport and basic consumer goods in the market, 
have had a more pronounced effect. Especially was this true in the sector of Caio and 
São Domingos (Cacheu Region), where it was estimated that half the bolanhas were still 
being cultivated in 1980. The percentage of villages with abandoned bolanhas in the 
different administrative sectors varied between 34% and 48% in Biombo region and 78% 
and 95% in Cacheu region. In the south for instance, in the sector of Fulacunda, the 
percentage was only 13%.
No doubt, the war had decisive negative effects on the local population working in the 
bolanhas as well. Up to now no exhaustive census of the effects of the war on abandoned 
territory has been made, but Hochet (1979a:26-39) provides us with a detailed study of 
villages on the bank of the Cumbidja river. To take the example of the Bédanda sector 
alone, 20 villages and their bolanhas were abandoned during the war of liberation; six 
more villages could only partially keep up the cultivation of their rice fields. How could 
the peasants cope with this situation after the war? When they returned to their villages 
they did not give priority to reconstructing their houses but to rehabilitating the very 
base of their future [169] existence, the bolanhas. ln the first three years the families had to 
live from the cultivation of cassava and the earnings of their wives, as the salinated and 
dilapidated rice fields were not productive. The reclamation works were considerably 
hampered by the lack of manpower. Many of the able bodied men stayed in the army or 
in the newly-established schools, or migrated permanently to the urban centres of 
neighbouring countries. Thus the village of Cabedu Balante lost 25 labourers out of 72 
before the war; another village, Botehe-Jati, lost one third of its labour force. This meant 
that the age group which was mainly responsible for the communal work of dike (re-
)construction, was considerably reduced too. And in addition the family heads were 
lacking the means to provide the boussa, that is meals and drinks, necessary to invite 
9those groups on to their bolanha. All this seriously undermined the communal mode of 
production said to be prevailing in the south (Handem 1986:62), which had already 
been weakened by the commercialization of social relations (for instance the payment of 
age group members in cash complementing or replacing gifts in kind for the group as a 
whole.
These social problems were aggravated by economic restrictions imposed by the new 
socialist nation state, especially the prohibition on selling local rice on the free market, 
and a price policy unfavourable to the peasant producer. A study of producer prices in 
Guinea-Bissau made in 1985 estimates the net return to the producer in the swamp rice 
fields at only 92 Peso (P.G.) per day, whereas returns to cassava, the commercialization of 
which has not been regulated by the state, were 353 P.G. and the prevailing wage rate for a 
daily labourer about 300 P.G. (SCET AGRI, Aug. 1985:5/6). Only a doubling or 
quadrupling of the official producer price could guarantee labour productivity in rice 
production which would at least equal the current wage rate. At that time wages for hired 
labourers in the bolanhas accounted for 63% of total cost of production on average (ibid: 
63). The latter too may indicate the high degree of substitution of communal by hired 
labour and the subsequent changes on the mode of production since colonial times. No 
wonder that under the prevailing conditions many peasants produced just for their own 
subsistence or even had to suffer hunger.
Because of these unfavourable economic conditions for swamp rice production, villages 
have made many demands for state assistance in the reclamation of old or the opening up of 
new bolanhas. In the view of many peasants it was the duty of the new nation state to 
compensate them for their efforts and losses during the war of liberation. Apparently the 
ambiguous notion of the state or development administration as a unity distinct from the 
peasantry, with aims and needs not necessarily shared by the peasants, a notion derived from 
colonial times, still holds. It paralyses local self-help initiatives, which were held in high 
esteem by the guerilla [170] forces during the liberation war and up to 1976, but were 
neglected when the ruling class realized that it no longer needed the collaboration of 
the people for its own well-being (Rudebeck 1982:19, 39-42).
Nevertheless the Department of Hydraulics and Soils (DHAS) of the new Ministry of 
Agriculture in Bissau, responsible for the planning and execution of the projects, responded 
to the peasants' demand. Since 1979 it has placed priority on the southern regions, 
presumably because of the especially grave ecological conditions and difficult land tenure 
problems in the north which could not be solved in the short run.
There are two categories of reclamation project: first, the 'traditional type' with simple 
means of production and a high degree of local participation, and second the 'modern 
type' with high costs of machinery and qualified labour. A preliminary survey of the 
DHAS reveals that between 1975 and 1983 16 projects of the latter type had been executed, 
covering 5169 ha. The reclamation costs per ha varied between 4458 P.G. and 6975 P.G., 
which was said to compare favourably with reclamation costs in neighbouring countries 
like Senegal. These costs were covered by heavy development aid from external 
governmental and non-governmental sources.
Although the DHAS had already opted at an early stage for small-scale projects at the 
village level with homogeneous target groups, which could facilitate the expected 
mobilization of the peasants, reality seems to be quite different. Despite all official 
declarations about assistance for self-help groups, regionalization of development planning 
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and condemnation of large-scale projects, there still seems to be a covered preference for 
'grand' projects. One such project was the reclamation of the abandoned bolanhas of 
Como-Caiar (viewed as the cradle of the guerilla movement), included in the first national 
development plan, 1983-86, which took off after some delay in 1986 with an investment of 
some 9 million US dollars.
In view of the inadequacy or complete absence of social feasibility studies and the lack 
of involvement of the peasants in the project, their rate of acceptance had been 
disappointingly low. According to estimates from the DHAS, up to 1986 just about 40% of 
the area rehabilitated with the help of machines since 1975 was in use. In the Biombo 
region the percentage was even as low as 20% because of land tenure problems, soil acidity, 
lack of labour, religious-magic barriers, and so on (pers. inf., DHAS).
Besides the capital intensive projects which made integrating the population 
difficult, the Ministry of Agriculture aided the rehabilitation of abandoned bolanhas under 
the 'traditional method' of reconstruction described above. These were mainly 'food-for-
work' programmes. The projects were executed either complementing to-the capital 
intensive dam constructions or independently. For an example of the latter, I quote [171] 
again the reclamation project in Biombo region which had deteriorated so much since the 
great restoration by the colonialists in the 1940s and 1950s that by 1986 only a small 
fraction of the bolanha was usable. The rest was covered by salt water and mangroves due 
to frequent ruptures of the dikes.
Despite interim political changes at national and local level, the way this work was 
organized by the development administration seemed to have changed little. In 1986 
officers responsible for development planning in that region still held the notion that the 
population of Biombo was lazy and did not appreciate the administration's efforts to help 
them. Peasants who did not want to attend the 'voluntary work' at the dikes were still 
being beaten up by the police and put into prison for one night, to work the following day 
under close supervision in the bolanhas. The supervisor of the works in Picle, the regulo of 
Biombo, was incidentally the same who had supervised the work in 1951 and 1971 under 
the colonialists. He earned a medal of honour from the Portuguese at that time for his 
'excellent services'. He himself said that part of the population now resented his 
installation because of his involvement in the harsh conditions of supervision under the 
Portuguese. But the administration had apparently no equally qualified person to offer. 
And since after being temporarily deposed as local ruler, he was newly installed and 
even became a party member, the local power elite did not object either. The Ministry 
even pays him a small remuneration for his supervision.
When the reclamation started at the end of February 1986, only 50 to 60 of the 114 
families expected to participate in the works were represented on the work site. Normally 
they had to work ten hours a day without break, as the supervisor said. But when we 
visited the place one morning, the first labourers did not arrive until about 10.30 am. No 
wonder, because the incentive was not great. First, the food promised by the Ministry 
came late and was insufficient. Apart from some tins of oil and fish, just 15 bags (45 kg) of 
rice were provided for 50 to 70 labourers for 45 days, a ration of just 230 to 330 gr per 
labourer per day, which compares unfavorably with the daily rate of twice 400 gr. under 
the colonial regime. Second, the motivation to participate in the work is partly political 
(for example the national youth organization, JAAC, made some campaigns to assist 
in the work), partly dependent on the economic benefit derived from the project. 
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The underlying assumption was that every proprietor of one part of corda of the dike 
(about 15 to 30 m) had equal access to the area cultivated. But the latter depended on the 
labour force (family or non-family) which the owner commanded in the initial stage of 
clearing the mangrove within the new bolanha. This labour force varied of course. If the 
final yield of one corda of bolanha varies between 20 and 300 bushels per production unit, 
how could one reasonably expect the peasant who harvests only 20 [172] bushels, not 
even meeting his subsistence needs and obligating him to seek secondary sources of 
income, to have the same interest in the bolanha as a rich full-time farmer, who harvests 
300 bushels? The main reason of the low participation in this project was howevever 
according to the President of the Regional Council of Biombo, that only the old 
proprietors of the bolanha would be entitled to the newly reclaimed land. The others had to 
rent the land at the price of one cow for the cultivation of one corda for five years. These 
contracts, however, carry a great risk. If the soil remains fertile, if the rains are sufficient 
and come in time, and if there is no break in the dike, the contract could yield a profit. But
past experience showed this to be highly unlikely. Therefore some 'politically advanced' 
villagers like the President himself and members of the JAAC participated voluntarily in 
the project for two or three days without any economic benefit, but similar political 
consciousness could hardly be expected from the majority of the villagers.
In view of the poor participation, the project supervisor thought of renewing his list of 
missing labourers. Finally even prisoners from the regional prison in Quinhamel had to 
work on the dike. During June 1986 I met six prisoners, all of them members of the yangue-
yangue, a religious political movement forbidden in the country, working under the 
supervision of local homens grandes (village elders) on the re-enforcement of the dike. In 
March/April of the same year another group of 14 yangue- yangue prisoners were 
employed. The use of forced labour in the project is an especially delicate question, not 
just because of the reminiscences of  colonial times, but also because the yangue-yangue 
could be considered a grassroots political movement which had originally sprung up in 
response to the disappointment of villagers - especially women - at the unfulfilled promises 
of the liberation movement and the new socialist state (cf. Jong 1987). 
In all 519 ha were reclaimed in the 1985/86 campaign in Biombo region under the 
'traditional' method (pers. inf., DHAS). Similar projcects were carried out in other parts of 
the country, presumably in the north, but since 1983 also in Tite (Quinara region), thanks 
to the provision of food by the food aid programme of PAM. Unfortunately, statistics are 
not yet available to quantify these projects.
Besides the 'traditional type' rehabilitation of the DHAS, the Integrated Rural 
Development Project of the regions of Cacheu, Oio, and Biombo has implemented about 
30 land reclamation projects with a total of 5683 ha since 1978. Its rate of acceptance or 
utilization too is very low. In 1984 on average 35% of the newly gained bolanhas lay idle. 
The  main reasons given were again land tenure disputes, toxidity of the soil, lack of labour 
and religious-magical problems. Details of the social aspect of this lack of acceptance are 
insufficiently known but are being investigated (SAWA 1985; 1985a). [173] 
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Conclusion
A comparative analysis of the implementation of land reclamation projects during 
colonial and post-colonial times reveals astonishing similarities: especially the 
centralization of development efforts in the hands of administrators disconnected from the 
grassroots, lack of target group analysis and misconceptions about the aims and needs, as 
well as the resources, of the population involved in the development efforts, on the part 
of the administration. The effects of this negative conditioning process of 'development' 
over many years on the chances of cooperation between peasants and the administration 
are still largely unknown. Any development planner who wants to encourage the local 
population to take their future into their own hands, would have to take account of this 
negative conditioning process.
Notes 
1. cf. footnote 245 by P. Hair in Donelha (1625/1927:297); the Creole term bolanha seems to be of 
Mandinge origin.
2. Fidi tchon in Creole, i.e. 'to dig the first hole' by the regulo at the beginning of each growing 
season.
3. Much information on the reclamation of bolanhas in colonial times has been collected from the 
Boletim Cultural de Guine Portuguesa (in the text abbreviated as B.C.), and on similar projects 
after independence from the Balances Annuals of the DHAS (Departamento de Hidraulica 
Agricola e Solos), see also FAO/DHAS (1983). References to these sources are only made in case 
of literal quotations, translated from the Portuguese by the author.
4. In 1968 the reports mentioned for the first time the utilization of caterpillars for the 
reclamation of the bolanha of Jaal-Impagina in Safim District. In the campaign of 1969/70 
about 880 ha of bolanhas were reclaimed with the help of the machine park of the Colonial 
Agricultural Service. Later on land reclamation projects were even postponed because of a lack 
of tractors for construction. This may indicate a shift to a more capital intensive technology of 
land reclamation, implying less local participation which seems quite a reasonable assumption
under the then prevailing conditions of 'social insecurity' in the countryside due to the war of 
liberation. But the scanty information available does not allow a definite conclusion. 
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